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We explore the quality of risk assessment for entrepreneurs/small business borrowers as com-
pared to consumers, when the same information on previous credit history is used for both
segments in marketplace lending. By building several cross-sectional logistic regression and
machine-learning models and applying them separately to small business loans (SBL) and
consumers we can measure models' predictive accuracy for di®erent segments, and thus, make
observations about the value of the information used for screening. We ¯nd the di®erences in
pro¯les between SBL and consumers, hence they should be assessed by separate models. Yet
separate SBL models do not perform well when applied to a future time period. We attribute
this to the relatively low predictive value of personal credit history for entrepreneurs as com-
pared to the consumers. We advocate the use of additional information for risk assessment of
entrepreneurs, in order to improve the quality of credit screening. This should lead to improved
access of small business borrowers to credit in situations when they have to compete with
consumers for funding.
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In recent years much needed external funding for small business ventures and
entrepreneurs has become available through novel routes, such as marketplace ¯-
nance or peer-to-peer (P2P) lending (Ahmed et al. 2016, Bruton et al. 2015). The
di±culties of small businesses in getting funding from traditional banks are
well documented, often they have to compete with large corporates (Mills &
McCarthy 2014, 2016, Jagtiani & Lemieux 2016). In marketplace lending entrepre-
neurs in many cases have to compete with consumers, since P2P platforms may serve
both types of customers. Furthermore, entrepreneurs often fund their businesses
through retail credit products, especially at the early stages of business life.
Whether any credit application is successful, largely depends on risk
assessment  the procedure known as screening. Nowadays, and especially with
large-scale lending, screening is done by scoring models that rely on historic data
(Altman et al. 2018, Thomas 2009). One of the main determinants of screening
quality is predictive value of the information that goes into the model. The current
paper explores this particular topicthe predictive value of personal credit history
of entrepreneurs in evaluating their potential creditworthiness in the context of
marketplace or peer-to-peer (P2P) lending.
There are numerous studies and well-established models for credit scoring of large
corporates (e.g. Altman 1968) and consumers (e.g. Thomas 2009), these two groups
of models di®er in the type of information that is used for predictionbusiness
models rely mainly on ¯nancial accounts and market information, whilst consumer
models use mostly personal credit history (such as FICO score) and socio-
demographics. For consumers, there also have been studies into determinants of
credit risk/default in marketplace lending (e.g. Emekter et al. 2015). There is also
literature, albeit less voluminous, on risk of small ¯rms (SMEs) using business in-
formation (e.g. Altman et al. 2010).
However, SMEs are known to be particularly challenging for credit risk assess-
ment because of the scarcity of relevant business information that can be used as an
input into risk models (Berger & Frame 2007). SMEs may not have stock prices or
detailed ¯nancial accounts that can be used by lenders for screening potentially bad
loans. The problem is especially acute for start-ups that may not have any business-
related information at all. That is why in marketplace lending they can be assessed as
consumers using personal information. This practice is also common in traditional
lending. Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), the largest credit bureau for businesses,
mention that lenders normally request personal credit history for start-up and micro-
businesses, although it may be not an accurate indication of business performance
(Dun & Bradstreet 2021). However, D&B do not provide any further details and to
the best of our knowledge, there are no studies about the information value of
personal credit history for risk screening of entrepreneurs, especially in the context of
new alternative lenders, and this is the main research question that this paper
addresses.



































































































This question is important because with low information value and resulting poor
predictive performance of risk models lenders cannot rate credit risks accurately,
they grant credit to borrowers that cannot re-pay it, and reject potentially credit-
worthy applicants. This increases the price of loans, because lenders have to cover the
increasing costs from non-performing loans, and more and more good borrowers are
excluded from access to credit. This situation has been extensively analyzed in the
literature on information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard (Ja®ee &
Russell 1976, Stiglitz & Weiss 1981).
Our research question becomes even more important in the current situation,
when the need for external funds has increased enormously due to the e®ects of
Covid-19 pandemic and lockdown. At the same time traditional bank lending to
small businesses has been declining for over a decade at least in the USA (Cole 2018),
and during 2020 non-bank lenders and ¯nancial-technology companies have also
scaled down (Rudegeair 2020). Small businesses have to compete for funding with
large businesses and consumers even more.
Against this background, our speci¯c research objectives are as follows:
. What is the predictive value of the personal credit history for risk assessment
of entrepreneurs? Can it provide the same level of accuracy as compared to
consumers?
. How di®erent are risk pro¯les of entrepreneurs as compared to consumers? Should
these two segments be treated as one and screened with a single model?
. How e®ective is credit screening of entrepreneurs in marketplace lending, when
they are assessed with the same model as consumers? And when their risk is
estimated separately?
Our exploration is based on the data from Lending Club (LC), the US largest
marketplace lender and one of the biggest in the world. LC provides an on-line
platform for individuals and entrepreneurs to post a request for loans and for
lenders/investors to o®er the money and earn some interest. The personal loan
portfolio consists predominantly of individual borrowers seeking a relief from existing
debts, including credit cards (Re¯nance). However, it also includes a small propor-
tion of business/entrepreneurial loans. This allows us to compare small business
loans (SBL) to consumers using the same scope of information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review of research on small business and marketplace lending risk. Section 3 presents
the data and some descriptive statistics. This is followed by Probability of Default
(PD) logistic regression models and their predictive accuracy in Sec. 4. The explo-
ration of di®erences between SBL and Re¯nance customers is presented in Sec. 5.
Section 6 provides robustness checks, including the comparison of di®erent machine-
learning algorithms, as alternative modeling techniques to logistic regression. A
detailed discussion of the results is given in Sec. 7, with the ¯nal section (Sec. 8)
providing conclusions.




































































































There are two main strands of literature that our study builds on and contributes to:
small business lending/bankruptcy prediction and marketplace lending.
Despite the importance of small business for the economy, they often experience
di±culties in obtaining the external ¯nance, which is essential to their survival and
growth. Banks prefer lending to large corporates, since small loans are less pro¯table
and more costly to process (Rudegeair 2020). The lack of information on SMEs is
often regarded as a major di±culty in evaluating their risk pro¯le. Berger et al.
(2005), Berger & Frame (2007) comment on the di±culties that lenders face when
deciding which small businesses are creditworthy because of scarcity of the relevant
information that is indicative of a potential failure or default. The majority of small
companies do not have publicly traded equity which is the main source of informa-
tion used for assessing the corporate credit risk. SMEs ¯nancial accounts are often
incomplete and non-audited. Berger et al. (2005) suggest that personal credit scores
of entrepreneurs/business owners can improve risk assessment for informationally
opaque ¯rms, especially at the start-up stage. However, they do not investigate the
value of such information.
For corporate credit there have been many models previously proposed, their
detailed overview is given in Altman & Saunders (1997), Allen et al. (2004).
However, a number of studies noted that credit risk of SMEs is di®erent from
large corporates and should be assessed by separate models. Dietsch & Petey (2004)
show that small businesses are riskier as compared to corporates. Altman & Sabato
(2005, 2007) prove that risk assessment models for large corporates do not perform
well when applied to SMEs. They demonstrate that banks/lenders should develop
models and risk assessment processes for SME portfolios separate from large cor-
porates. Vallini et al. (2009), Ciampi & Gordini (2013) arrive to the same conclusion
that predicting default for SMEs is more di±cult and predictive accuracy is lower as
compared to corporates.
Furthermore, Altman et al. (2010) show that non-¯nancial and non-accounting
information about a business (such as age, industry, previous missed payments)
improves the quality of prediction for SME default. Later work by Altman et al.
(2017) prove that ¯nancial and non-¯nancial information remain predictive of de-
fault over longer time horizons  up to 10 years. However, this strand of literature
does not consider the value of personal credit history of business owners for pre-
dicting the non-payment or default.
Our paper also builds on the emerging strand of literature on marketplace
lending. Most widely researched questions include what factors are associated with
chances of a borrower to be funded; and what factors are associated with the
probability of default. Lin et al. (2013), Freedman & Jin (2014), Liu et al. (2015) ¯nd
that borrowers' online friendships and closer relationship with lenders have signi¯-
cant in°uence on the probability of funding success and lower default risk. Duarte
et al. (2012), Gonzalez & Loureiro (2014) analyze borrowers' pictures and ¯nd that



































































































\trustworthy" or \attractive" appearance improves the chances of being funded and
decreases default. Larrimore et al. (2011) show the e®ect of the quality and quantity
of loan's textual description on funding success. Iyer et al. (2016) ¯nd that soft or
non-standard information, e.g. appearance, acceptable maximum interest rate and
textual description, are signi¯cantly associated with default and improve prediction
of default probability as compared to predictions based only on borrower's credit
rating.
As for research based on Lending Club data, Emekter et al. (2015) discover that
FICO scores and credit grades estimated by LC play the most important role in
predicting default. Similarly, Serrano-Cinca et al. (2015) ¯nd that LC grades are the
most signi¯cant factors to predict default rates but the accuracy of the model is
improved by additional variables, such as loan purpose, annual income, housing
ownership, credit history, and borrower's indebtedness.
The above studies analyze samples of consumer loan portfolios. In terms of small
business loans (SBL), the research on LC data is scarce. Even if SBLs are included
into the sample, they are not analyzed separately. The exception is Mach et al.
(2014) who provide a detailed investigation of SBLs in LC portfolio from 2007–2012.
They ¯nd that small businesses are more likely to be funded compared to other loan
purposes after controlling for borrower's FICO score, employment, loan amount,
year of application, state of residence and House Price Index (HPI) in the state.
Small businesses are also more likely to be charged higher interest rates, but this is
explained by higher probability of default.
However, the above studies have not investigated how well their models predict,
and how predictive accuracy di®ers between consumers and entrepreneurs. Our re-
search closes this gap.
3. Data Description
The development of internet technologies has led to the emergence of on-line lending
platforms, such as Lending Club, Prosper, Zopa that serve as meeting places for
those who need some money and those who are willing to invest it. Typically, the
marketplace lenders o®er small ¯xed-term loans to individuals and businesses that
cannot get loans from traditional sources or cannot obtain them on equally attractive
terms.
Lending Club (LC) was among the world's largest marketplace lenders, as of
September 30, 2020 the company issued 60,188,236,052 USD in loans (Lending
Club 2010).a It enabled borrowers to obtain unsecured ¯xed-term loans with interest
rates that they found attractive, and investors to fund loans with credit character-
istics, interest rates and other terms the investors found attractive. The platform
charged borrowers an origination fee and investors a service fee.
a In 2020 Lending Club acquired Radius bank and announced that it would be closing the marketplace
platform. https://www.lendacademy.com/lendingclub-closing-down-their-platform-for-retail-investors/.



































































































LC veri¯ed the identity of borrowers, obtained their credit pro¯les from consumer
reporting agencies, such as TransUnion, Experian or Equifax, and screened bor-
rowers for eligibility to participate in the platform. The screening was based on the
prospective borrower's FICO score,b a debt-to-income ratio, a credit pro¯le (as
reported by a consumer reporting agency). Lending Club provided their own risk
grades, and set the interest rates based on the risk level. In addition, LC made
available anonymized detailed information on loans granted and their subsequent
credit performance, that sophisticated investors could use to build their own
screening models (Lending Club 2010).
LC is ideally suited for our investigation because of the large volume of loans, a
business model which is typical to many other marketplace lenders (Jagtiani &
Lemieux 2016) and the fact that it lent to both consumers and small businesses. LC
had a dedicated platform for SMEs, but businesses needed to be at least 12 months
old and to have at least 50,000USD in annual sales, in order to apply there. Those
businesses/entrepreneurs that did not meet these criteria could still apply to the
consumer loan platform, and it is these businesses that we are interested in.
In this paper, we concentrate on year 2012. The choice of the year was prompted
by the desire to include loans with the duration of 60 months, the latest year when
such loans reach maturity was 2017 (at the time of data download), which meant
that they had applied in 2012.
Small business loans (SBL) constitute a very small proportion in LC consumer
credit portfolio as can be seen from Fig. 1. Figure 1 shows that LC consumer portfolio
is dominated by \debt consolidation" and \credit card payo®" categories, i.e. indi-
viduals that seek restructuring of their existing debt in hope of getting better terms.
For subsequent analysis we combine these two categories together into one large
group of \Re¯nance" that constitute 77% of the consumer portfolio, since both
categories have the same goal of seeking debt relief.
The share of SBLs in 2012 is 2.6% or 1386 loans, and their default rate is the
highest one  25.47%. The default is de¯ned as Charged O® or 16þDays Past
Due (DPD).
There are two loan maturities/terms: 36 and 60 months. It is known that longer
durations attract riskier borrowers (Hertzberg et al. 2018) and this is evident from
Table 1. For SBLs the share of \60 months" loans in 2012 is higher (21.14% as
compared to 18.55%) and the Default Rate is higher too (43.69% versus 27.53% 
Re¯nance 60 months).
There are several possible explanations why entrepreneurial loans demonstrate
such a high default rate. In this paper, we do not aim at answering the question what
are the reasons leading to default, instead we focus on exploring one possible ex-
planation: the screening of loans is less e®ective for SBL given the information
available for risk assessment.
bA FICO score by Fair Isaac Corporation is a numeric credit risk rating of consumers that ranges between
300 and 850. Higher scores correspond to a lower risk of defaulting on credit obligations.



































































































To answer this question, one can estimate Probability of Default using the
information/variables available to LC at the point of application and measure the
accuracy of prediction. To put this measure of predictive accuracy into the context,
one can compare it to the equivalent measure for other loan purposes. If the pre-
dictive accuracy is worse for SBLs, this would indicate less e®ective screening and low
information value of personal credit history for risk assessment of entrepreneurs. We
use \Re¯nance" as the main benchmark group for comparison because (1) this is the
largest group, other loan purposes are too small and idiosyncratic to allow for robust
modeling and comparison; (2) these customers are typical to marketplace platforms,
Fig. 1. Number of loans and default rate by loan purpose, 2012. The left-hand side axis and bars refer to the
numbers of funded loans for di®erent purposes. The right-hand side axis and lines show the percentage of
defaulted loans within each category, or default rate.
Table 1. Default Rates by maturity/loan term (all loans, re¯nance and SBL), 2012.
Term/maturity No default Default Total
Share in total




36 months 37567 5903 43470 81.45 13.58
60 months 7172 2725 9897 18.55 27.53
Re¯nance (Debt consolidationþ credit card payo®)
36 months 28952 4502 33454 83.84 13.46
60 months 5568 2154 7722 16.16 27.89
Small Business Loans (SBL)
36 months 868 225 1093 78.86 20.59
60 months 165 128 293 21.14 43.69



































































































e.g. LC stated as a main goal on its website: \Our LC
TM
Marketplace Platform helps
borrowers take control of their debt and empowers everyone to reach their ¯nancial
goals".c In general, Chava & Paradkar (2018) claim that for marketplace borrowers
in the U.S., more than 70% state that their primary reason for requesting funds is to
pay o® more expensive debt by replacing it with cheaper monthly re-payments.
4. Probability of Default (PD) Modeling
As a ¯rst step, we model PD using the LC risk sub-grades (their internal credit risk
ratings that are available to investors), and dummy variables indicating if the ac-
count is SBL or Re¯nance in comparison to other loan purposes which are combined
into the reference category. At this stage we use the whole dataset for 2012 with all
loan purposes, the dependent variable is observed loan status (Default ¼ 1), as il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. If dummy variables are statistically signi¯cant, it would mean
that there are omitted or unobserved predictors of default and the dummy variables
proxy for them. This will give the evidence as to whether LC grades contain su±cient
information to describe the PD risk for SBL and Re¯nance. We also control for loan
duration.
In this section, we follow the principles of credit risk modeling for consumers
(credit scoring) as described in Anderson (2007), Siddiqi (2006), Thomas (2009).
Logistic regression is the most widely used algorithm in consumer credit risk,
therefore, it is used in this section. The parameter estimates of this ¯rst model are
given in Table 2.
The dummy for SBL is highly signi¯cant and positive, meaning that SBL have
odds of default almost twice higher compared to other loans after controlling for LC
risk sub-grades and loan duration. Since the dummy is signi¯cant, there is some
unobserved information associated with default for small businesses. One can say
that the risk of SBLs is not adequately captured by the information contained in risk
grades. The dummy for Re¯nance has a negative sign, but is signi¯cant only at 10%
level, implying the risk of re¯nancers is more adequately represented. The Odds
ratio is close to 1, therefore, Re¯nance is not signi¯cantly di®erent from other loan
purposes.
We then focus on more detailed information which is available to investors when
they decide which project to invest, in order to understand the level of accuracy that
can be achieved when modeling default for Re¯nance and SBL; and statistically
signi¯cant risk predictors for each segment. The characteristics that are available for
default prediction are mainly credit bureau variables, and some limited information
about the loan (term, amount, purpose) and borrower (home ownership, employ-
ment length, annual income). The full list of variables used in this paper together
with the summary statistics is given in Appendix A. There are a lot of missing values
in bureau variables in 2012 (a very common problem in practice), and this prevented
chttps://www.lendingclub.com/.



































































































previous studies from using the full set of potential independent variables. Thus,
Mach et al. (2014) use FICO score, income, loan amount, term, home ownership,
employment length. We overcome this limitation by categorizing or binning vari-
ables with missing valuesan approach common in credit scoring and machine-
learning. Missing values become one of the categories, and this approach also has an
advantage of dealing with outliers and any nonlinear patterns.
The logistic regression model is trained on all loans in 2012 (training sample) with
stepwise selection of variables (statistically signi¯cant at 5% level). Then tailored
models are developed for Re¯nance and SBL, in order to check if default prediction
improves when these segments have separate risk assessment models.
The principles of credit scoring require the models to be tested on the out-of-time
sample, in order to evaluate how the model will perform beyond the time period it is
trained on, because the main objective of predictive models is to predict into the
future. In order to evaluate the predictive accuracy the loan performance needs to be
known, therefore our out-of-time test sample consists of loan applications made in
2013, with loan performance observed between 2013 and 2018.
The predictive accuracy is measured by two standard measures used in
both business failure prediction and consumer credit scoring: Area under the
Curve (AUC) and Accuracy Ratio (AR) (Bishop 2006, Engelmann et al. 2003,
Thomas 2009). AUC is obtained by plotting percentage of correctly predicted
defaults (1-Type 1 error) against percentage of incorrectly predicted non-defaults
(Type 2 error) for all values of predicted PD. AUC summarizes the quality of pre-
diction over all possible cut-o®s with higher values indicating better prediction: from
0.5 (no separation between classes, a random prediction) to 1 (maximum possible
separation). Accuracy Ratio (AR) is related to AUC (Engelmann et al. 2003) and
takes values from 0 (no separation) to 1 (perfect separation): AR ¼ 2 AUC-1.
Table 3 presents Accuracy Ratio and Area under the curve (AUC). The perfor-
mance is assessed separately on Re¯nance and SBL segments. It makes sense to
compare the models to internal LC assessment process, thus LC risk grades (A is the
best, G - the worst) are used as a benchmark.
Table 2. Logistic regression to model default from LC risk sub-grades.a
E®ect DF Parameter estimate Wald Chi-Square P -value Odds ratio
LC sub- grade 34 2023.5723 < 0:0001
Term 60 months 1 0.1749 108.0577 < 0:0001 1.419
SBL 1 0.5853 70.5919 < 0:0001 1.796
Re¯nance 1 0:0566 3.3233 0.0683 0.945
Note: Model ¯t: AIC ¼ 44905:38, Pseudo R-sq ¼ 0:044, n ¼ 53367.
aThe dependent variable Default ¼ 1 (Charged O® or 16þDays Past Due). The reference
(omitted) dummy is \Other Loan Purposes". DF stands for Degrees of Freedom. Category
parameter estimates for LC sub-grade are available on request.



































































































Predictive accuracy reported in Table 3 is relatively modest. There is some im-
provement for logistic regression as compared to LC risk grades, more pronounced for
2012, which is to be expected because it is the training set. Nevertheless, even in
2013, which is used as a test sample, there is still almost 10% improvement in
Accuracy Ratio over LC risk subgrades. There is practically no di®erence when the
logistic model is re-trained for Re¯nance segment separately, and this is to be
expected, since Re¯nance constitutes almost 80% of all loans.
For SBL segment re-training the separate model notably improves the predictive
accuracy in 2012, but the most likely reason is over¯tting, since when applying the
model to 2013, any gains disappear, and there is practically no di®erence between LC,
Logistic all and SBL logistic. This can be attributed to the instability of predictors.
Table 4 shows that there are only six variables selected into the model as compared to
Table 3. Accuracy ratio and area under the curve for LC risk grades, Logistic regression developed and
applied to the whole portfolio, \Re¯nance" and \SBL", training and testing samples.
Dataset segment
2012 (train) 2013 (test)
All Re¯nance SBL All Re¯nance SBL
Model Accuracy ratio (AR)
LC risk subgrade 0.304 0.306 0.308 0.33 0.336 0.236
Logistic all 0.4 0.396 0.382 0.362 0.364 0.242
Re¯nance logistic 0.4 0.364
SBL logistic 0.424 0.23
SBL logistic with cross-validation 0.376 0.222
Area under the curve (AUC)
LC risk subgrade 0.652 0.653 0.654 0.665 0.668 0.618
Logistic all 0.7 0.698 0.691 0.681 0.682 0.621
Re¯nance logistic 0.7 0.682
SBL logistic 0.712 0.615
SBL logistic with cross-validation 0.688 0.611
Table 4. Signi¯cant (5% level) variables in SBL model, logistic regression.
# Variable DF Chi-sq P -value
1 Term 1 36.1665 < 0:0001
2 FICO score 1 25.039 < 0:0001
3 Number of accounts opened in past 24 months 4 22.4685 0.0002
4 Annual income 2 14.5684 0.0007
5 Loan amount 3 15.5548 0.0014
6 Number of credit bureau inquiries in past 6 months 4 16.4391 0.0025
Note: Model ¯t: AIC ¼ 1452:69, Pseudo R-Square 0.104, n ¼ 1386. Full details of pa-
rameter estimates are available on request, estimates for levels of categorical variables
are not included for the sake of compact presentation.



































































































21 signi¯cant predictors for Re¯nance model (Table 5). Following the suggestion of an
anonymous reviewer, in order to mitigate the over¯tting, we perform 5-fold cross-
validation for the SBLmodel. This reduces the AUC on the training set from 0.712 to a
more realistic 0.688, however, the performance on the test set becomes also worse. If
there is a weak association between the available predictors and default, it is impos-
sible to develop the accurate model. It is better to assess SBL with the whole portfolio
model, yet the result is still signi¯cantly lower as compared to Re¯nancers.
Small number of signi¯cant predictors means that even minor changes make the
model less predictive on a test sample. Besides, a poor performance of SBL model
raises the question about the information that can be used for modeling the risk of a
small business. If the personal credit history of business owners does not contain the
information with strong and stable associations with default, any model will not be
able to capture true underlying drivers of default.
5. Di®erences Between Re¯nance and SBLs
In this section, we are going to analyze the information available to Lending Club at
the point of application to show that SBLs di®er on a number of characteristics
Table 5. Signi¯cant (5% level) variables in re¯nance model, logistic regression.
# Variable DF Chi-sq P -value
1 Term 1 964.927 < 0:0001
2 FICO score 1 695.192 < 0:0001
3 Annual income 8 265.216 < 0:0001
4 Number of accounts opened in past 24 months 8 241.573 < 0:0001
5 Loan amount 8 135.966 < 0:0001
6 Months since most recent inquiry 9 86.425 < 0:0001
7 Number of instalment accounts 4 59.86 < 0:0001
8 Months since most recent bankcard opened 9 57.7826 < 0:0001
9 Purpose 1 40.6216 < 0:0001
10 Number of accounts opened in past 12 months 6 33.6335 < 0:0001
11 Ratio of total current balance to high credit/credit limit for all
bankcard accounts
9 29.31 0.0006
12 Total high credit/credit limit for all bankcard accounts 8 26.0958 0.001
13 Months since most recent revolving account opened 9 25.4283 0.0025
14 The number of months since the borrower's last delinquency 9 24.7726 0.0032
15 Debt To Income (DTI) 8 24.3283 0.002
16 Percentage of all bankcard accounts > 75% of limit 8 24.0433 0.0023
17 Revolving line utilization rate, or the amount of credit the borrower
is using relative to all available revolving credit
8 21.9431 0.005
18 The number of credit bureau inquiries in past 6 months 4 16.7973 0.0021
19 Total credit balance excluding mortgage 8 16.0575 0.0416
20 Home ownership 2 10.3922 0.0055
21 Number of open revolving accounts 2 9.3838 0.0092
Note: Model ¯t: AIC ¼ 33804:61, Pseudo R-Square 0.0678, n ¼ 41176. Full details of parameter estimates
are available on request, estimates for levels of categorical variables are not included for the sake of
compact presentation.



































































































from Re¯nancers. First, we ¯t logistic regression to predict if the loan is likely to be
an SBL as opposed to Re¯nance. We use the same predictors, i.e. personal credit
history, as in the previous section and stepwise selection as before. The numeric
variables that do not have missing values, such as DTI or Loan Amount, are entered
as they are, variables with missing values are split into equally sized categories or
bins (containing similar number of accounts) and entered as categorical with dummy
variable parametrization. The bins are numbered in the ascending order, with higher
values of the original variable corresponding to a higher category number, and \99" -
to missing. The ¯rst (lowest) category is excluded from estimation as a reference one,
i.e. the one that is used to interpret the parameter estimates of the other categories
for this variable. For example, Loan amount has the reference category that contains
the smallest amounts observed in the training sample, therefore, positive signs for
statistically signi¯cant categories 5,6,7,8 mean that borrowers with larger loan
amounts are more likely to be small businesses.
There are 14 variables statistically signi¯cant at 5% level (Table 6), and the
model's predictive accuracy is better than when predicting default (AUC ¼ 0:776,
Table 6. Variables signi¯cant in distinguishing SBL from re¯nance.
Variable Category Estimate P -value Odds ratio
Intercept 0:4494 0.4563
Revolving line utilization rate 2:085 < 0:0001 0.124
DTI 0:0535 < 0:0001 0.948
The number of credit bureau inquiries in past 6
months
0.213 < 0:0001 0.735
The number of open credit lines in the borrower's
credit ¯le
0:0445 0.0002 0.956
The total number of credit lines currently in the
borrower's credit ¯le
0:0162 < 0:0001 0.984
# of 30þ days past-due delinquency in the bor-
rower's credit ¯le for the past 2 years
0.1032 0.0194 1.109
Loan amount
(Ref: smallest loan amounts)
1 0:0564 0.6817 0.945
2 0.0493 0.7169 1.051
3 0.0203 0.8824 1.02
4 0:0477 0.737 0.953
5 0.3001 0.0243 1.35
6 0.456 0.0007 1.578
7 0.5306 < 0:0001 1.7
8 1.117 < 0:0001 3.056
Percentage of all bankcard accounts > 75% of limit
(Ref: lowest number of cards that utilize more than
75% of credit limit)
1 0:4575 0.0009 0.633
2 0:6064 < 0:0001 0.545
3 0:6397 0.0004 0.527
4 0:7323 < 0:0001 0.481
5 0:6967 < 0:0001 0.498
6 1:1366 < 0:0001 0.321
7 0:3439 0.3562 0.709
9 0:7977 < 0:0001 0.45
99 0:0569 0.8237 0.945



































































































AR ¼ 0:552). SBLs have lower Debt to Income (DTI) ratio, lower number of credit
accounts, lower credit limit for bank cards and lower utilization rate, since the signs
on the corresponding variables are negative. Yet they have higher loan amounts and
total credit balances. The positive sign on The number of credit bureau inquiries can
Table 6. (Continued )
Variable Category Estimate P -value Odds ratio
Total bankcard high credit/credit limit
(Ref: lowest values)
1 0:1401 0.3305 0.869
2 0:1097 0.4447 0.896
3 0:1077 0.4532 0.898
4 0:2541 0.0871 0.776
5 0:4934 0.0014 0.611
6 0:479 0.0018 0.619
7 0:4199 0.0044 0.657
8 0:4747 0.0013 0.622
99 0:2906 0.2633 0.748
Number of accounts opened in the last 12 months
(Ref: lowest number)
1 0:0557 0.7009 0.946
2 0.1829 0.2132 1.201
3 0:3157 0.0941 0.729
4 0:171 0.4451 0.843
6 0.0235 0.9241 1.024
7 0.6925 0.1306 1.999
99 0.3846 0.0031 1.469
Number of satisfactory accounts
(Ref: lowest number)
1 0:0975 0.5772 0.907
2 0:3061 0.0964 0.736
3 0:4417 0.0292 0.643
4 0:2632 0.4245 0.769
99 0.0374 0.842 1.038
Employment length
(Ref: < 1 year)
n/a 0:468 0.0395 0.626
1 year 0.131 0.3603 1.14
2 years 0.1815 0.1705 1.199
3 years 0.3249 0.0171 1.384
4 years 0.2509 0.07 1.285
5 years 0.0575 0.68 1.059
6 years 0.1463 0.3111 1.158
7 years 0.1419 0.3536 1.152
8 years 0.1805 0.2757 1.198
9 years 0:0895 0.6365 0.914
10þ years 0:1886 0.1118 0.828
Total credit balance excluding mortgage
(Ref: lowest balance)
1 0:1481 0.2613 0.862
2 0.1407 0.2866 1.151
3 0.0873 0.5288 1.091
4 0.2131 0.1362 1.238
5 0.2106 0.1642 1.234
6 0.3871 0.0096 1.473
7 0.5757 0.0002 1.778
8 0.6168 0.0001 1.853
Home ownership
(Ref: Rent)
Mortgage 0.232 0.0003 1.261
Own 0.1528 0.1761 1.165
Note: Predictors with missing values are categorized with higher values corresponding to a larger cate-
gory number, dependent variable SBL ¼ 1.



































































































be interpreted as a higher need for credit. This variable records the requests from
lenders for credit history of credit applicants, and the positive sign indicates that
SBL applicants shop around for credit more than Re¯nancers. It seems that despite
having more spare credit capacity in comparison to Re¯nancers, entrepreneurs,
nevertheless, are more credit-constrained. There is no information as to the terms
and conditions of the credit lines outside LC, but it is possible to suggest that these
conditions may drive business borrowers to seek more credit and/or better terms, or
the existing spare capacity is not su±cient.
As for the credit performance, SBLs are likely to have lower number of satis-
factory accounts as compared to Re¯nance. Besides, they are likely to have higher
number of delinquencies on their credit ¯le. They are also more likely to have
mortgages which is consistent with Jagtiani & Lemieux (2016) who comment on the
tendency of SMEs to use mortgages as a source of business funding. In terms of
Employment length SBLs are likely to have 3–4 years of employment history.
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the data structure, and as a
robustness check we have also summarized all information available at the appli-
cation point into several uncorrelated dimensions. This has been done by Factor
Analysis for Mixed Data (FAMD) by Le et al. (2008) that combines PCA for numeric
variables and Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) for categorical ones. The
results are consistent with those reported above and are available on request.
6. Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
In this section, we conduct the robustness checks for sample selection bias and to
ensure that the discrepancy in information value between SBLs and Re¯nancers is
not dependent on the variables chosen and/or classi¯cation algorithm used.
The LC loan applications go through preliminary selection as described in Sec. 3,
therefore, the PD models developed on the accepted applications may be subject to
selection bias. The information published on rejected applicants is much more re-
stricted as compared to funded loans, for sample selection modeling we could only use
the following variables: FICO score, DTI, Requested Loan Amount, Employment
Length, Loan Purpose.
The selection bias correction consists in estimating the selection equation (usually
by binary probit) and then using this equation to correct the parameters in the model
of interest. We use the approach for binary response models proposed by Amemiya
(1978) that involves estimating the two models simultaneously and this corrects for
the endogeneity problem that occurs due to the selection bias. Greene (2006) argues
that simultaneous or joint estimation is superior to the two-step approach that
mimics the original model proposed for the continuous response by Heckman (1979).
In line with the majority of literature on sample selection, we use the binary probit
regression instead of logistic. These models are very similar (Greene 2006), as con-
¯rmed by our results in Table 7, where we ¯rst estimate probit PD model without
sample correction. There are no or negligible di®erences with logistic PD.



































































































We are still interested in the predictive accuracy, and if there is a discrepancy
between Re¯nance and SBL observed in Sec. 4. Although there is a signi¯cant cor-
relation between selection and PD models, and there are changes in PD parameter
estimates, the accuracy of PD estimation for Re¯nance is almost the same, as can be
seen from Table 7. It may seem surprising, however, Banasik & Crook (2004) report
similar results for a di®erent credit portfolio. Nevertheless, there is a striking change
for SBL, as predictive accuracy deteriorates dramatically. Note that this cannot be
taken as the evidence that SBLs are disproportionately rejected, this is the conse-
quence of adjusting the parameter estimates of already unstable model, which leads
to even worse performance.
In short, we could not achieve the improvement in the predictive accuracy. Since
the main objective of our study is to evaluate the predictive value of personal credit
history, we did not pursue this analysis further. In subsequent checks, we used the
models estimated on accepted applications only, since they gave the best predictive
performance.
Further, we estimate the PD models for SBLs and Re¯nancers using the most
powerful machine-learning (ML) techniques. The predictive accuracy is reported in
Table 8 for the models with binned predictors (similar to earlier analysis) and feature
selection. However, we have also experimented with a di®erent method of dealing
with missing values and used all variables that are provided by LC in their original
form, i.e. we do not perform any feature selection or transformation. Namely,
we have performed MCMC multiple imputation (Rubin 1987, Graham 2012),
which have been shown to perform well in the context of credit risk modeling
Table 7. Predictive accuracy with selection bias correction.
Dataset segment
2012 (train) 2013 (test)
Re¯nance SBL Re¯nance SBL
Model Accuracy ratio (AR)
Re¯nance logistic 0.4 0.364
Re¯nance probit 0.396 0.366
Re¯nance probit with selection correction 0.388 0.364
SBL logistic 0.424 0.23
SBL probit 0.424 0.232
SBL probit with selection correction 0.264 0.136
Area under the curve (AUC)
Re¯nance logistic 0.7 0.682
SBL logistic 0.712 0.615
Re¯nance probit 0.698 0.683
SBL probit 0.712 0.616
Re¯nance probit with selection correction 0.694 0.682
SBL probit with selection correction 0.632 0.568


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Florez-Lopez 2010). Yet in our analysis MCMC multiple imputation has demon-
strated slightly inferior predictive accuracy on the out-of-time test sample, and
therefore, is not included here. These results are available on request.
The choice of machine-learning techniques is based on studies that compared
di®erent algorithms in credit context (Brown & Mues 2012, Lessmann et al. 2015)
and include Neural Networks (NN)Multi-Layer Perceptron, Support Vector
Machines (SVM)Linear and with Radial Basis Function (RBF), Random Forests,
Bayesian Networks, Gradient Boosting of Decision Trees (XG Tree) and of Linear
Models (XG Boost). We have also experimented with balancing the training
samplea technique common in machine-learning in order to bring the target
classes (Default/Non-Default) to the 50:50 ratio. It has improved the performance of
several, but not all models. A detailed description of the algorithms is beyond the
scope of this paper, but the interested reader can refer to Bishop (2006).
Table 8 reports the predictive accuracy of ¯ve algorithms that have shown best
predictive performance, with a standard Logistic Regression for comparison. Similar
to the analysis in previous sections and in line with machine-learning methodology
we test the models on the independent out-of-time samplethe loans originated in
2013. The algorithms in Table 8 are sorted by descending Area under the ROC-curve
(AUC). The results demonstrate similar pattern as in Sec. 4. All algorithms perform
well on the training sample, some of them achieve a remarkable performance of above
0.8, yet when applied to independent out-of-time test sample, the performance drops.
Again similar to Sec. 4, the drop in performance is much more pronounced for SBLs
as compared to Re¯nancers. For the latter, the maximum drop is 0.091 (or 12.38%
from the ranking accuracy achieved on the training sample) for Neural Networks.
For the former, the smallest drop is 0.096 (or 13.48%) for Linear SVM and the
maximum reaching 0.277 (or 31.77%). This con¯rms our initial observations that
predictive value of personal credit history is higher for consumers rather than
entrepreneurs.
7. Discussion
Our results show that the credit risk models developed on the personal credit history
predict into the future far less accurately for entrepreneurs as compared to con-
sumers. This is important because personal credit history is often used to evaluate
the risk of entrepreneurs and small business owners in absence of other information.
This is especially common when entrepreneurs apply for retail credit in order to
¯nance their business needs, which is the case with Lending Club (LC)  the P2P
lender used in the analysis.
We ¯rst estimate the Probability of Default (PD) with the LC internal credit risk
ratings, loan duration and dummy variables for small business loans (SBLs) and
Re¯nancers. We ¯nd that the dummy for SBL is highly signi¯cant and positive, with
odds of default for SBLs twice higher as compared to other loans after controlling for
LC risk ratings and loan duration. One can say that the risk of SBLs is not



































































































adequately captured by the information contained in risk grades, and the dummy
variable proxies for omitted or unobserved predictors of default. The dummy for
Re¯nancers is signi¯cant only at 10% level, implying the risk of re¯nancers is more
adequately represented by LC risk grades.
We then proceed with the analysis of detailed information about loans that LC
makes available to investors (e.g. FICO scores, annual income, etc.), in order to un-
derstand to what extent this information is helpful in predicting default, and therefore,
in making a good investment, and whether there are di®erences in its predictive value/
accuracy for SBLs and Re¯nancers. We approach the information value from the Data
Science perspective, and use standardmeasures for evaluating predictive accuracy.We
estimate several logistic regressionmodels, andmeasure predictive accuracy separately
for SBLs and Re¯nance, and on the training sample (applications funded in 2012) and
out-of-time test sample (applications funded in 2013).
The model developed on the whole sample provides a modest level of predictive
accuracy which is slightly higher for Re¯nance than for SBL in 2012 (AUC ¼ 0:698
vs 0.691). The di®erence becomes more pronounced on the test set, 0.682 vs 0.621.
One would expect that the credit risk of entrepreneurs/small business owners is
di®erent to that of consumers and this may be the explanation for the observed
discrepancy. It is known that small businesses di®er from large corporates, and it is
suggested that separate credit risk models should be developed for them (Altman &
Sabato 2005). We follow the same logic and develop separate models for Re¯nance
and SBL. A separate Re¯nance model shows a slight improvement if compared to the
whole sample model in 2012, and the same performance in 2013. However, a separate
SBL model whilst predicting well in-sample, demonstrates a drastic performance out-
of-time and out-of-sample. The attempt to correct for over¯tting with cross-vali-
dation does not improve the out-of-time/out-of-sample prediction. In fact, it is better
to apply the whole sample model to SBL because it gives slightly better performance
in 2013 – 0.621 as compared to 0.615 of the SBL model. Nevertheless, the di®erence is
marginal, and both results are signi¯cantly below the predictive accuracy for Re¯-
nance.
We attribute this to low predictive value of personal credit history and low
stability of association between credit history and probability of default (PD) of
entrepreneurs. Variables signi¯cantly associated with PD in one year, become in-
signi¯cant in the next one, making it di±cult to screen the loans.
We show that for Re¯nance it is possible to achieve a stable screening of rea-
sonable quality, yet it is a much bigger problem for entrepreneurs. The low screening
quality of the information can be detrimental to closing the lending gap for small
businesses, since inability to assess the risk constraints the credit growth. A higher
default rate should not in itself restrict access to credit if the credit risk is accurately
estimated and priced accordingly. There are risk-seeking investors with preference
for higher returns. However, inability to predict risk is a serious problem.
As the next step in our exploratory analysis, we compare SBLs to Re¯nance, in
order to understand if their risk pro¯les are indeed di®erent. The latter group is the



































































































largest category of loans in LC portfolio and one can argue these are \typical"
customers not only of LC, but many marketplace lenders. These customers are also
normally perceived as the highest risks. We ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences in the
information/risk pro¯les of SBL and Re¯nance, with SBLs being less leveraged but
having a greater demand for credit, with worse repayment history and containing a
higher proportion of mortgage holders.
As robustness checks we correct for the selection bias. We also employ a wider
range of most advanced machine-learning algorithms, to make sure that the results
do not depend on a speci¯c model. Whilst all algorithms perform well on the training
sample, the performance on the independent out-of-time test sample is considerably
worse, and the drop in performance is much more pronounced for SBLs as compared
to Re¯nancers, con¯rming the results obtained with the logistic regression.
The results support the view that improvements in predictive accuracy are more
likely to come from new types of information rather than from algorithmic side,
which in turn reinforces the importance of our investigation of the value of the
entrepreneurs' previous personal credit history for predicting their performance.
Despite the insights, the study is not without limitations. Our study uses one year
of funding, future research can investigate earlier years or concentrate on loan term
of 36 months to increase the time span and provide further insights into credit
behavior of entrepreneurs applying to LC consumer platform. Another limitation is
investigation of one marketplace lender. Whilst this lender is one of the largest in the
world and is a good representative of the industry, in general, investigation of other
platforms is necessary to con¯rm the generalizability of the results. Nevertheless,
many new and traditional lenders use personal credit history as inputs in their credit
risk models, and our results should inform them of the di®erential predictive value of
this type of information for entrepreneurs as compared to consumers.
8. Conclusions
This paper presents an exploratory analysis of one year of loans granted by Lending
Club (LC), with the aim to understand the information value of personal credit
history for risk evaluation of small business loans (SBL). We compare SBL to con-
sumers that seek to re¯nance/consolidate their existing debt (Re¯nance), for whom
previous credit history is a logical type of information, traditionally used in credit
risk assessment. We ¯nd there are signi¯cant di®erences in the pro¯les of SBL and
Re¯nance borrowers, with the most notable ones being that SBLs are less leveraged
but have a greater demand for credit. Their credit performance is likely to be worse,
and they are more likely to have mortgages which is consistent with previous ¯ndings
that SMEs use mortgages as a source of business funding (Jagtiani & Lemieux 2016).
When it comes to predicting Probability of Default (PD), we ¯nd that the per-
sonal credit history does have some predictive power (better than a random model),
but this power is modest and does not allow for the e®ective discrimination between
Defaults and Non-Defaults for SBL in comparison to Re¯nance. Whilst it is possible



































































































to achieve higher predictive accuracy on the training sample (year of 2012), any gains
disappear when the model is applied out-of-time and out-of-sample (year 2013).
There are only six statistically signi¯cant variables in the PD model for SBLs as
compared to 21 variables in Re¯nance PD model, and it is not surprising that the
SBL model cannot achieve high predictive accuracy when applied to new samples.
This suggests that information value of personal credit history is lower for
business borrowers in comparison to consumers, and this has important implications
in terms of restricting their access to retail credit products. We advocate the need for
additional information in order to improve the quality of screening for entrepreneurs.
These exploratory ¯ndings raise several questions for further investigation that
should be of interest to researchers in the areas of credit risk and entrepreneurial
¯nance. One line of inquiry concerns further investigation of di®erent types of in-
formation that would improve the quality of credit screening of entrepreneurs. How
can entrepreneurs signal their quality? And to what extent di®erent signaling
mechanisms can be connected to the subsequent performance of the loan? Answers to
these questions will help to solve the problem of small business lending gap, in
particular for start-ups.
Another direction of future research follows from the indications that entrepre-
neurs applying for marketplace lending are credit constrained. This prompts an
investigation of where the marketplace lending comes in the pecking order of funding
sources; and what types of entrepreneurs turn to these novel sources of external debt.
Appendix A
Table A.1. The list variables used with description.
Short name Description
Acc Open Past 24Mths Number of trades opened in past 24 months
Annual Income The self-reported annual income provided by the borrower during
registration
Avg Cur Bal Average current balance of all accounts
Bc Open To Buy Total open to buy on revolving bankcards
Bc Util Ratio of total current balance to high credit/credit limit for all
bankcard accounts
Chargeo® Within 12 Mths Number of charge-o®s within 12 months
Collections 12 Mths Ex Med Number of collections in 12 months excluding medical collections
Credit history The number of months from the borrower's earliest reported credit
line
Default Repayment performance: 1 if Loan Status is Charged O® or Late; 0
otherwise
Delinq 2Yrs The number of 30þ days past-due incidences of delinquency in the
borrower's credit ¯le for the past 2 years
DTI A ratio of total monthly debt payments on total debt obligations
divided by self-reported monthly income



































































































Table A.1. (Continued )
Short name Description
Employment length Employment length in years between 0 (less than one year) and 10
(ten or more years)
FICO The upper boundary range the borrower's FICO at loan origination
belongs to
Home ownership The home ownership status: RENT, OWN, MORTGAGE, OTHER
Inq 6Mths The number of inquiries in past 6 months (excluding auto and
mortgage inquiries)
LC Grade LC assigned loan grade from A (low risk) to F (high risk)
LC sub-grade LC assigned loan sub-grade from A1 (low risk) to F5 (high risk)
Loan amount The listed amount of the loan applied for by the borrower
Mo Sin Old Il Acct Months since oldest bank installment account opened
Mo Sin Old Rev Tl Op Months since oldest revolving account opened
Mo Sin Rcnt Rev Tl Op Months since most recent revolving account opened
Mo Sin Rcnt Tl Months since most recent account opened
Mort Acc Number of mortgage accounts.
Mths Since Last Delinq The number of months since the borrower's last delinquency
Mths Since Last Major Derog Months since most recent 90-day or worse rating
Mths Since Last Record The number of months since the last public record
Mths Since Recent Bc Months since most recent bankcard account opened
Mths Since Recent Bc Dlq Months since most recent bankcard delinquency
Mths Since Recent Inq Months since most recent inquiry
Mths Since Recent Revol Delinq Months since most recent revolving delinquency
Num Accts Ever 120 Pd Number of accounts ever 120 or more days past due
Num Actv Bc Tl Number of currently active bankcard accounts
Num Actv Rev Tl Number of currently active revolving trades
Num Bc Sats Number of satisfactory bankcard accounts
Num Bc Tl Number of bankcard accounts
Num Il Tl Number of installment accounts
Num Op Rev Tl Number of open revolving accounts
Num Rev Accts Number of revolving accounts
Num Rev Tl Bal Gt 0 Number of revolving trades with balance > 0
Num Sats Number of satisfactory accounts
Num Tl 120Dpd 2M Number of accounts currently 120 days past due (updated in past 2
months)
Num Tl 30Dpd Number of accounts currently 30 days past due (updated in past 2
months)
Num Tl 90G Dpd 24M Number of accounts 90 or more days past due in last 24 months
Num Tl Op Past 12M Number of accounts opened in past 12 months
Open Acc The number of open credit lines in the borrower's credit ¯le
Pct Tl Nvr Dlq Percent of trades never delinquent
Percent Bc Gt 75 Percentage of all bankcard accounts > 75% of limit
Pub Rec Number of derogatory public records
Pub Rec Bankruptcies Number of public record bankruptcies
Purpose A category provided by the borrower for the loan request
Re¯nance Re¯nancing consumers: 1 if Purpose ¼\credit card" or
\debt consolidation", 0 otherwise
Revol Bal Total credit revolving balance
Revol Util Revolving line utilization rate, or the amount of credit the borrower
is using relative to all available revolving credit
SBL Small Business Loan: 1 if Purpose ¼\small business", 0 otherwise
Tax Liens Number of tax liens



































































































Table A.2. Summary statistics for numeric variables.
Short name Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum % Miss
Acc Open Past 24Mths 3.91 2.67 0 40 14.04%
Annual Inc 69720.23 58654.51 4800 7141778 0.00%
Avg Cur Bal 13235.01 16821.35 0 800008 51.98%
Bc Open To Buy 8251.61 13482.97 0 497445 15.03%
Bc Util 66.28 27.36 0 187.9 15.08%
Chargeo® Within 12 Mths 0.0015 0.0430 0 3 0.00%
Collections 12 Mths Ex Med 0.0004 0.0194 0 1 0.00%
Credit History 175.75 81.44 36 650 0.00%
Delinq 2Yrs 0.2017 0.6361 0 18 0.00%
DTI 16.66 7.59 0 34.99 0.00%
Fico Range High 705.39 32.34 664 850 0.00%
Inq 6Mths 0.83 1.01 0 8 0.00%
Loan amount 13461.71 8086.93 1000 35000 0.00%
Mo Sin Old Il Acct 122.57 50.93 1 649 54.19%
Mo Sin Old Rev Tl Op 172.05 84.93 9 658 51.98%
Mo Sin Rcnt Rev Tl Op 14.05 16.29 0 264 51.98%
Mo Sin Rcnt Tl 8.73 9.63 0 174 51.98%
Mort Acc 1.61 2.17 0 24 14.04%
Mths Since Last Delinq 36.69 21.52 0 152 58.84%
Mths Since Last Major Derog 42.41 20.85 0 152 89.91%
Mths Since Last Record 91.66 23.20 1 119 97.24%
Mths Since Recent Bc 24.79 28.94 0 538 14.89%
Mths Since Recent Bc Dlq 41.39 21.16 0 152 87.43%
Mths Since Recent Inq 6.69 5.99 0 24 24.90%
Mths Since Recent Revol Delinq 38.05 21.22 0 152 73.92%
Num Accts Ever 120 Pd 0.32 0.92 0 26 51.98%
Num Actv Bc Tl 3.66 2.08 0 30 51.98%
Num Actv Rev Tl 5.53 2.93 0 34 51.98%
Num Bc Sats 4.60 2.46 0 32 30.08%
Num Bc Tl 9.12 4.88 0 44 51.98%
Num Il Tl 7.54 6.34 0 57 51.98%
Num Op Rev Tl 7.91 3.80 0 39 51.98%
Num Rev Accts 14.77 7.34 0 57 51.98%
Num Rev Tl Bal Gt 0 5.55 2.94 0 34 51.98%
Num Sats 10.94 4.53 1 46 30.08%
Num Tl 120Dpd 2M 0.0001 0.0108 0 1 51.98%
Table A.1. (Continued )
Short name Description
Term The number of payments: 0 for 36 months; 1 for 60 months
Tot Coll Amt Total collection amounts ever owed
Tot Cur Bal Total current balance of all accounts
Tot Hi Cred Lim Total high credit/credit limit
Total Acc The total number of credit lines in the borrower's credit ¯le
Total Bal Ex Mort Total credit balance excluding mortgage
Total Bc Limit Total bankcard high credit/credit limit
Total Il High Credit Limit Total installment high credit/credit limit
Total Rev Hi Lim Total revolving high credit/credit limit
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Total Bc Limit 19609.34 18471.92 0 522210 14.04%
Total Il High Credit Limit 33104.30 35893.60 0 902504 51.98%
Total Rev Hi Lim 28392.23 25001.40 0 988000 51.98%
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